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A Long Island judge has dismissed a $6 million defamation action filed by a teenager against four former classmates who set up a Facebook page on which they joked that the teen used heroin and contracted AIDS by having sex with animals in Africa.

The judge ruled that no reasonable person could believe that the allegedly defamatory statements were facts.

"A reasonable reader, given the overall context of the posts, simply would not believe that the Plaintiff contracted AIDS by having sex with a horse or a baboon or that she contracted AIDS from a male prostitute who also gave her crabs and syphilis, or that having contracted sexually transmitted diseases in such manner she morphed into the devil."

"Taken together, the statements can only be read as puerile attempts by adolescents to outdo each other."

The judge also dismissed a negligent-supervision claim against the teenagers' parents, saying that a computer does not constitute, as required by New York case law, a "dangerous instrument." "To declare a computer a dangerous instrument in the hands of teenagers in an age of ubiquitous computer ownership would create an exception that would engulf the rule against parental liability," the judge concluded.

The plaintiff in Finkel v. Dauber sought $3 million for the damage to her reputation and character and another $3 million in punitive damages.

In June 2009, a Manhattan judge granted Facebook's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 which provides immunity to service providers for "information originating with a third-party user."

In dismissing the case, the judge found that "while the posts display an utter lack of taste and propriety, they do not constitute statements of fact. The entire context and tone of the posts constitute evidence of adolescent insecurities and indulgences, and a vulgar attempt at humor. What they do not contain are statements of fact."

This case illustrates the continuing difficulty in applying even long-established legal principles to cyberspace where hyperbole and conjecture are contagious. According to this court, the more sensational the statement, the more protection the poster will enjoy. In a world where almost anything is possible, and most of it is posted online, individuals seemingly enjoy less and less protection from even the most outrageous and sensationalistic statements.

In a recent little noticed unpublished First Circuit decision, former USSC Justice Souter held that "whatever the scope of a school’s responsibility towards its students . . . there is no apparent constitutional obligation to impose physical restraint upon teenagers not at immediate risk of harm to themselves or others."

This case was brought by mothers of teenagers who were not physically restrained by school officials from leaving their schools during instructional hours. The mothers brought action under state law as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988 seeking monetary and injunctive relief for violating Fourteenth Amendment due process, the mothers’ right to preserve family integrity and the children’s right to enjoy freedom from abuse and neglect.

The school system explained their policy of permissiveness by referring to a state education regulation limiting use of lawful physical restraint to instances in which children’s unfettered behavior would raise a risk of “assault or imminent, serious, physical harm” to themselves or others; absent such danger, the prevention of truancy would not be worth the burden of defending the liability claims that would doubtless eventuate.

The magistrate judge hearing the case below recognized that the schools’ refusal to confine children to school premises during school hours effectively converted the state’s compulsory attendance law into the children’s option to wander off into trouble that the parents could not effectively prevent. He suggested that the mothers consider the possibility of relief from the general regulation through Individual Educational Plans for their children as special education students.

The mothers argued that inadequate supervision in schools infringes their rights to maintain the integrity of their families under Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), cases that held it to be beyond the power of states to limit a parent’s choice to provide foreign language instruction in elementary schools or to resort to private education. The Court found, however, that these cases recognized a parent’s liberty to be free from state interference with certain education choices, not a right to require state or local government to run public schools in a way a parent might think they ought to be administered. Any actionable interference with family integrity must be “directly aimed at the parent-child relationship.” Manarite v. Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 960 (1st Cir. 1992).

Judge Souter further found that the Supreme Court’s discussion in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989), is on point: “[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." According to Souter:

The situation of the children in this case is not even close to facts that would thus raise a state obligation. There is neither restraint of the child (that indeed is the very complaint), nor any practice or circumstance rendering the child unable to care for himself, nor failure to provide basic human needs of food, clothing, shelter, medical care or reasonable safety. As the Supreme Court later observed in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995), “we do not, of course, suggest that public schools as a general matter have such a degree of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to protect’” (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200).

This decision did not consider any rights parents might have under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act [IDEA] or other state or federal regulation. Clearly, the court might have found that a policy and practice of allowing special education students to leave with impunity might effectively deny them a free appropriate public education [FAPE]. Beyond this, however, there is no Constitutional duty for schools to keep children in the classroom, nor is there any apparent duty to insure their safety or well-being (or even notice to the parents or police) once they leave school grounds.

The case is Saez v. City of Springfield.

Legislators and courts have long recognized what common sense makes clear - children depicted in child abuse images[1] are harmed not only by the sexual abuse captured by the images, but also by the subsequent distribution, possession, and viewing of the images of their abuse.[2] Legislators and courts have similarly recognized the importance of awarding restitution to victims who are harmed by crime to help make them whole, and to aid in their recovery.[3] Thus, it seems a straightforward proposition that children depicted in child abuse images should be awarded restitution from their offenders, including those offenders who possess and view their abuse. In fact, this simple supposition seems to underpin the statute governing restitution in cases involving sexual exploitation.[4]

Despite the logic, justness, and legality of affording restitution to the victims in child abuse images, federal courts differ greatly in their approach to the restitution rights of these victims[5] in the context of possession cases. As discussed below, over the last year alone, courts have awarded these victims full restitution, partial restitution, di minimus restitution, or even no restitution at all. These differences in outcome can be attributed, at least in part, to varied legal interpretations of the governing restitution statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2259. This article provides a brief overview of the current state of the law, and suggests that a court-based or legislative solution is urgently needed to avoid further victimization of these victims.

This unusual international adoption case, which was recently decided by New York's highest court, has far-reaching implications for current and future best-practices as well as important policy implications. In L.M.B. v. E.R.J., 2010 NY Slip Op 1345; 14 N.Y.3d 100 (February 16, 2010), the New York Court of Appeals was called upon to untangle a New York adoption by ERJ (mother) and a Cambodian adoption by LMB (father). Each adoptive parent, who were never married to one another, claimed to be the child's only legal parent.

The child, Doe, was found abandoned in Cambodia and brought to New York by ERJ for medical treatment. Subsequently ERJ and her boyfriend, LMB, decided that they would both adopt Doe. Both ERJ and LMB erroneously believed that Cambodian children could not be adopted in the United States. It was decided that LMB (who because he had been born in Trinidad and could reclaim Trinidadian citizenship) would adopt Doe in Trinidad and Tobago. Once that adoption was finalized, ERJ would adopt Doe in New York.

As part of this plan, Cambodia issued a “document” to LMB in June 2004 which, according to the translation submitted by LMB, was entitled “ADOPTION CERTIFICATE” and stated that LMB “is allowed to adopt” Doe. The Trinidadian adoption plan never materialized. ERJ then decided she could adopt Doe in New York. LMB asked Cambodia to “relinquish” the permission he was given to adopt Doe and ERJ obtained a “certificate” like the one which was originally given to LMB.

In January 2006, ERJ filed a petition to adopt Doe in New York but did not give LMB notice of the adoption.This adoption was granted in June 2006. In August 2006, LMB discovered this adoption and moved to vacate. In the meantime the Cambodian government issued documents affirming ERJ's right to adopt and nullifying LMB's.

The lower court declared the New York adoption invalid because the 2004 Cambodian action was actually an adoption of Doe by LMB, not just permission to adopt. Based on the facts and expert testimony, the court agreed with LMB that he was Doe's father and that his parental rights had never been relinquished or extinguished. Therefore, ERJ could not adopt Doe in New York without notice to and consent from LMB.

On appeal, ERJ argued that New York should not give comity to the Cambodian adoption and claimed that LMB was not Doe's father under New York law. The Court of Appeals explained that foreign adoptions are generally recognized unless there are truly compelling reasons not to, like cases in which “enforcement . . . is shocking to the prevailing moral sense.” Because there were no compelling reasons not to recognize his Cambodian adoption of Doe, LMB's adoption would be recognized by New York.

Interestingly, the Court of Appeals raised an argument ERJ failed to make. In 2004, Doe and LMB were living in New York, not Cambodia, and Doe had very little, if any, prospect of ever returning to Cambodia. Thus, in 2004 New York had as much legal interest in who should adopt Doe as Cambodia. ERJ's fatal error was ignoring the premise that Cambodia's position on the status of it own citizen was at least entitled to some recognition in New York.

Once the Cambodian adoption was given effect however, LMB's subsequent surrender of his parental rights was governed by New York, not Cambodian law. Since LBM's surrender of his parental rights was improper under New York law, it was declared void. The Court held that “when New York parents have acquired, by virtue of a foreign country adoption, parental rights that are recognized in New York, those rights can no longer depend on the vagaries of a foreign country's law”.

[The court gave no weight to ERJ's “act of state” argument and rejected her “best interest of the child” argument by pointing out that the child's best interest do not “automatically” validate an “otherwise illegal adoption” and the father's rights cannot be ignored because a court thinks the child should be adopted by someone else.]

This opinion bears close reading reading because the issues are sure to appear again in different factual and legal situations. The most important principle to remember is that once a foreign adoption is finalized, the law of the state where the child resides controls all future legal decision-making about that child. Adoptive parents will not be allowed to return to the country where the adoption was originally finalized to make any changes concerning the child's custody, guardianship or legal parents. What the Court did not decide is what would happen if the original foreign decree was illegal, invalid or procured by fraud or corruption. That issue will have to wait for another day which will surely come soon.

Guest analysis by Harvey Schweitzer, Esq.

Mr. Schweitzer is a lawyer whose practice in Washington D.C. and Maryland focuses on legal matters pertaining to children and the provision of services to children including foster care, child abuse and neglect, adoption,custody and mandatory reporting. He is the co-author of Foster Care Law: A Primer. Contact him at harvey@schweitzerlaw.net or go to www.schweitzerlaw.net

The long awaited decision in the first sexting case to reach a federal appeals court was issued yesterday by a unanimous Third Circuit. The verdict: "appearing in a [sexting] photograph provides no evidence as to whether that person possessed or transmitted the photo."

In other words, as I correctly opined here in December, a minor depicted in a sexting image is only guilty of a child pornography offense if the prosecutor can prove that they possessed or distributed their image; a teen's appearance in a sexting image (even an image of bona fide child pornography) is not, in and of itself, a violation of current law.

As the Third Circuit stated:

Assuming that the sexual abuse of children law applies to a minor depicted in the allegedly pornographic photograph, and that the photo in question could constitute a “prohibited sexual act” (issues on which we need not opine), we discern no indication from this record that the District Attorney had any evidence that Doe ever possessed or distributed the photo.

The Court threw out the prosecutor's case against the sexting students for reasons totally unrelated to the content of the images basing its decision instead on First Amendment constitutional rights related to the prosecutor's threats of prosecution, the imposition of a mandatory educational class and a parent's fundamental Constitutional right to control their child's education (concerning the prosecutor's proposed class).

Bottom line: despite the use of the term "First Amendment Rights," the Court's Constitutional analysis is completely unrelated to the content of the sexting images. The Court side-stepped the entire issue at the heart of the sexting debate by basing its decision on procedural issues and not the substantive issues of whether or not sexting constitutes child pornography and whether or not sexting teens have a Constitutional right to produce lurid images of themselves.

The question of whether or not sexting = child pornography will have to wait for another day which will certainly come since this fad shows no signs of abating.

Appellate decisions regarding foster care are rare and decisions that focus on foster children are rarer still. So when two decisions appear in the space of about a week they deserve some commentary. One is from the Maryland Court of Appeals, Maryland's highest court, and addresses an issue of great interest: under what circumstances and to what extent does a foster child's attachment to foster parents impact the rights of the biological parents when such parents are confronting the termination of their parental rights? The other case, from the New York Appellate Division, also addresses an issue of interest: can foster children sue foster parents for negligent supervision?

A lesson that can be learned from both cases is that the laws that affect foster care in general and foster children in particular are far from uniform. Each case provides insight into these important issues and suggests how the law may evolve.

FindLaw columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb takes on a question involving my client that has sharply divided courts: Should a person who is found to have committed the crime of possessing child pornography be required to pay restitution to each child who appears in those images? The question has been posed very sharply recently, because images of one child victim -- whose pseudonym is "Amy" -- have been at issue in 350 criminal cases across the country. Moreover, the difference in the amount of restitution awarded in those cases is dramatic: Two Florida judges together awarded over three million dollars; a California judge awarded only $5000; and a Texas judge refused any award at all.

Read Professor Colb's entire article here.

From The Legal Intelligencer:

Lawyers were scratching their heads on Thursday over a federal appellate court's seemingly conflicting rulings in a pair of closely watched student-speech cases that both involve high school students who were suspended for creating fake MySpace pages on their home computers to ridicule their principals.

Although the cases appeared at first glance to raise nearly identical legal questions about the limits on a school's power to discipline students for off-campus speech, the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the student in Layshock v. Hermitage School District and with the school in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District.

In Layshock, a unanimous three-judge panel declared that punishing students for off-campus speech violates their First Amendment rights. But the Blue Mountain panel split, voting 2-1 in holding that students may be punished for lewd speech on the Internet about school officials that has the potential to create a substantial disturbance at the school.

In Layshock, Judge Theodore A. McKee concluded that the student's suspension violated his First Amendment rights because the speech took place almost entirely off campus.

"It would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state in the guise of school authorities to reach into a child's home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that they can control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored activities," McKee wrote.

"Allowing the district to punish Justin [Layshock] for conduct he engaged in using his grandmother's computer while at his grandmother's house would create just such a precedent," McKee wrote in an opinion joined by Judges Jane R. Roth and D. Brooks Smith.

But in Blue Mountain, Judge D. Michael Fisher concluded that school officials have the power to punish "student speech, whether on- or off-campus, that causes or threatens to cause a substantial disruption of or material interference with school or invades the rights of other members of the school community."

The Constitution, Fisher said, "allows school officials the ability to regulate student speech where, as here, it reaches beyond mere criticism to significantly undermine a school official's authority in challenging his fitness to hold his position by means of baseless, lewd, vulgar, and offensive language."

In dissent, Judge Michael A. Chagares said he believed that "neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever allowed schools to punish students for off-campus speech that is not school-sponsored and that caused no substantial disruption at school."

Read the entire story on Law.com.

The first law review article on the topic of wrongful death of children in foster care has just been published. It is co-authored by Daniel Pollack, Professor at the School of Social Work at Yeshiva University in New York City and a frequent expert witness in child welfare lawsuits, and Gary Popham, Jr., an attorney in Arizona. For a PDF of the article please contact Professor Pollack.

For more articles on ChildLaw by Professor Pollack click here.

More coverage and an update from the Legal Intelligencier on Friday's first ever federal appeals court hearing on sexing as child pornography:

As the nation's first case involving criminal prosecutions of teenagers for "sexting" made its way to a federal appeals court in Philadelphia, all three judges seemed skeptical of the prosecutor's claim that child pornography laws are violated when a teen transmits a nude image of herself.

The three 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals judges also appeared poised to declare that former Wyoming County District Attorney George Skumanick Jr. violated the First Amendment rights of three girls with his threat of a criminal prosecution if they refused to take a class he had designed to educate youths about the dangers of sexting.

More on this case at the First Amendment Center and Wilkes-Barre Times Leader.

This just in from the Legal Intelligencier:

A federal appeals court on Friday takes up the growing practice of "sexting" — in which teenagers transmit nude and semi-nude photos of themselves and others by phone — as the judges tackle the vexing question of whether such images can be deemed child pornography.

The appeal in Miller v. Skumanick stems from a civil rights suit brought by three Wyoming County girls against then-District Attorney George Skumanick Jr. alleging that he violated their First Amendment rights with his threat of a child pornography prosecution if they refused to take a class he had designed to educate youths about the dangers of sexting.

The case is the first in the country to challenge the constitutionality of bringing child pornography charges in the context of sexting.

I covered this case extensively last spring at Sexting Students Strike Back where you can find the legal complaint, several comments, and links to coverage in the New York Times and Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.

Thanks to Professor Paul Cassell for this post on The Volokh Conspiracy involving one of my cases:

Yesterday U.S. District Judge Patrick Schiltz of the District of Minnesota issued an interesting order regarding a restitution application in a child pornography case. In his order, found here, Judge Schiltz chastises the government for failing to pursue restitution for child pornography cases in his district, even though Congress has made restitution mandatory in such cases. Judge Schiltz wrote:

This Court has recently handled a number of other child-pornography cases in which the United States Probation Office has identified victims who are seeking restitution. Notwithstanding the strict mandates of § 2259, the government has also declined to pursue restitution in those cases. Given the clear Congressional mandate that those convicted of child pornography offenses pay restitution to their victims, the Court will no longer accept silence from the government when an identified victim of a child-pornography offense seeks restitution. If the government declines to seek restitution, the government will have to give the Court some explanation for its decision.

Also check out the Star Tribune which covered this issue in a story today.

Here is the full text of the judge's decision.

Minnesota Public Radio also covered this issue here.